as Albania and Macedonia, and of the possible negative consequences for the consolidation of the peace implementation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
These concerns were also reflected in official statements. On 6 March 1998, for example, after a lengthy discussion, NATO'S Permanent Council declared: 'NATO and the international community have a legitimate interest in developments in Kosovo, inter alia because of their impact on the stability of the whole region which is of concern to the Alliance' .3 The recognition that NATO has 'a legitimate interest in developments in Kosovo' was the starting point, at NA'TO'S headquarters in Brussels, for a discussion on the modalities of a possible military intervention by NATO along its periphery -an option that was already mentioned publicly in April." The issue of the international legal basis for such an action, including the question whether an explicit authorization by the Security Council would be needed, led to extensive discussions and differences of opinion among the allies. Meanwhile, at a more principled level, a similar debate took place on the fundamental relationship between NATO and the UN Security Council. After an initial discussion during NATO's ministerial meeting in Luxembourg, in June 1998, on the adaptation of NATO's New Strategic Concept to post-Cold War realities, Madeleine Albright, the us Secretary of State, summarized her position as follows: 'NATO's fundamental mission will always remain collective defence against aggression. At the same time, I stressed that we have always had the option to use NA'ro's strength beyond its borders to protect our security interests. If joint military action is ever needed to protect vital alliance interests, NATO should be our instrument of choice.' 5 she quoted President Clinton, who, on an earlier occasion, had said: 'Tomorrow's NATO must continue to defend enlarged borders and defend against threats to our security from beyond them -the spread of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic violence and regional conflict.' Ms. Albright , in this context, alluded to some of the problems that still had to be solved: the definition of 'core missions' and 'outof-area' operations, and the question whether there should always be a UN authorization for NATO to act. The us Secretary of Defence, William Cohen, arguing along the same lines, thought that it was not necessary for NATO to subordinate its security to the UN, emphasizing NATO's own autonomy in taking decisions. The us position, however, was not shared by all within NATO. Others said that they would not approve of the use of force by NATO without a UN mandate, fearing both the risk of alienating the Russians, among others, and the consequences such a precedent could set for others (the Russians, among others) in the future. 6 The differences of opinion on this issue among NATO's sixteen 3
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